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 Abstract - The aim of this paper is to explore the diﬀerent determinants of international comparative ad-
vantage. Starting from a theoretically well founded neoclassical framework, where specialization depends on
relative factor endowments and technological diﬀerences, we study the role of the institutional diversity in the
labor market. We use an international trade model where endogenous eﬀo r ti si n c l u d e di na no t h e r w i s es t a n d a r d
production function. Since the eﬀort level can be aﬀected by country-speciﬁc labor institutions, the institutional
context may in turn be able to inﬂuence the international comparative advantage. After illustrating the theoreti-
cal motivations for such an eﬀect, we implement a rigorous econometric analysis on a group of OECD countries to
test its empirical validity. We obtain that institutions have an important role in explaining the relative economic
performance of a number of manufacturing sectors. In particular, stronger labor market institutions are found
to advantage capital-intensive sectors and disadvantage labor-intensive ones. Policy implications are derived and
discussed.
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The most part of trade in the world is within the group of countries that have the most similar factor
endowments. This result, originally found by Treﬂer (1995), represents a strong rejection of the Heckscher-
Ohlin theorem that assesses that capital-abundant countries export capital-intensive goods and labor-
abundant countries export labor-intensive goods. Harrigan (1997a) provides a crucial contribution to
the empirical analysis of the theory of comparative advantage. The author tests the hypothesis that
international specialization is jointly caused by cross-country diﬀerences in relative factor endowments
and technological levels. He ﬁnds that both determinants of comparative advantage are relevant and
concludes in favor of the neoclassical model. However, the eﬀects of relative factor abundance are not
always very consistent with the theoretical predictions.
In this paper we argue that traditional trade theories based on comparative advantage overlook a third
crucial determinant: the institutional context. Although a number of works have been addressed to the
study of the relation between institutions and economic performance1, the idea that domestic institutions
aﬀect the relative advantage of a certain country in engaging in a certain activity is new and has never
been tested empirically. To give a clear focus and obtain testable predictions we only concentrate on
labor market institutions.
Our study is not aimed at discussing which labor institutions are the best for economic competitiveness
tout court. We approach the debate from a relative point of view. Indeed, since the quarrel on the optimal
institutional model for economic success is far away from the end, the best approach seems to shed light
on the combination of institutions that turns out to be (sub)optimal for each country considering its
speciﬁc production system and institutional context. Then, a certain institutional arrangement may be
good for a country and bad for another, may favor some sectors and disfavor others.
Our analysis is founded on a Heckscher-Ohlin model of international specialization that includes
variable eﬀort into the production function. Eﬀort is endogenous and can be aﬀected by country-speciﬁc
labor institutions. We obtain that strong labor market institutions relatively advantage the high wage
1With speciﬁc regard to the labor market institutions, see, e.g., Teulings and Hartog (1998), and for a collection of
works, Mishel and Voos (1992).
1and capital-intensive industries, while an institutional context that allows for low wage and high wage
dispersion contracts creates a comparative advantage in the labor-intensive sectors.
To support our predictions, we employ an econometric analysis for a group of OECD countries in
the 1970-1994 period. OECD (relative capital-abundant) countries trade more between each other rather
than with relative labor-abundant (poor) countries. Since factor endowments and technological levels
tend to be very similar within the OECD group, and since gains from trade stem from diversities between
traders, these countries must diﬀer along some other dimension that generates comparative advantage.
It is empirically well documented (Freeman, 1999, 2000, 2002; Blau and Khan, 1999) that labor market
institutions are the dimension in which OECD countries diﬀer mostly. As Blau and Khan (1999) point
out, while these countries oﬀer a high degree of comparability along a number of important dimensions,
strong diﬀerences still remain across them reﬂecting the characteristics of the labor market institutions.
Furthermore, Freeman (2000) shows that labor market institutions (union density and collective bargain-
ing coverage) in the OECD economies are changing in a way that is inconsistent with the prediction
of convergence to a single peaked model of capitalism. So, on ap r i o r igrounds, diﬀerent labor mar-
ket institutions seem to be a good candidate to add information on the determination of international
comparative advantage for this group of countries.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we report some theoretical motivations for our empirical
work and provide testable predictions. In section 3, we present our econometric strategy and a brief data
description. In section 4 results are reported and commented. Finally, in section 5 some conclusions are
drawn and policy implications are discussed.
2 Theoretical motivations
Consider a standard two-good two-factor Heckscher-Ohlin framework of international specialization and,
following Leamer (1999), include variable eﬀort into an otherwise standard production function. The
eﬀort-augmented production function embodies the capital cost savings from high-eﬀort operations. Then,
the eﬀective labor supply shifts upwards as the eﬀort level increases. The variable eﬀort is a factor-neutral
technological multiplier that depends on diﬀerences in “industriousness, attentiveness, ability, skills”,a n d
2so on. Since eﬀort is variable, labor contracts are multidimensional accounting for diﬀerent levels of wage
and eﬀort: higher wage oﬀsets the disutility of higher eﬀort. Capital is assumed to be indiﬀerent to
the eﬀort level so that, e.g., hard working pace and long operation time do not wear out the machine.
Therefore, the capital cost savings from high eﬀort are greater in the capital-intensive sector and this
industry is characterized by relatively high wage-high eﬀort contracts with respect to the labor-intensive
one. As a consequence, the model implies that countries with similar levels of eﬀort in the two sectors
have a comparative advantage in producing labor-intensive goods, while in countries where the eﬀort
levels in the two industries are more unequal, the eﬀort level is relatively higher in the capital-intensive
sector that will be relatively advantaged. Finally, Leamer (1999) assumes that, in each country, the eﬀort
level is upward bounded by a ﬁxed level.
We can now introduce labor market institutions deﬁned as “the system of laws, programs, and con-
ventions that can impinge on labor market behavior and cause the labor market to function diﬀerently
from a spot market” (Blau and Khan, 1999: 1400). Thus, labor market institutions aﬀect the labor allo-
cation into the production function. Following Leamer (1999) we maintain the hypothesis that diﬀerent
institutions cause the eﬀort level to be variable between communities.
A number of interesting predictions follow. Institutions that raise the eﬀort level through an improve-
ment in the working conditions imply an increase in the eﬀective labor supply and a rise of output in
the whole economy. Consider for instance an increase in the minimum wages and examine the eﬀects
on wages and eﬀort levels. The direct eﬀect is higher wages in the (low eﬀort-low wage) labor-intensive
sector. The indirect eﬀect is an upward shift in the eﬀective labor supply. This leads to an increase in
the demand for capital, so that the capital rental goes up and the wages go down in the capital-intensive
sector. As a consequence of the two eﬀects, wages become more equal between the two sectors. On the
other hand, eﬀort has increased in the whole economy, but, since it is upward bounded, in relative terms
it has increased more in the labor-intensive industry. Then, the minimum wage has created a comparative
advantage in the labor-intensive industry. In a similar vein, a high degree of coordination of the industrial
relations is predicted to force the eﬀort to be at the same level in diﬀerent sectors. Capital-intensive (high
eﬀort) industries are disfavored and labor-intensive (low eﬀort) ones are favored.
3The above predictions on comparative advantage stem from the two crucial hypotheses that Leamer
(1999) assumes: each community is characterized by a diﬀerent “attitude to work”and an absolute max-
imum level of eﬀort exists. In the following part of the paragraph, we discuss how these predictions
change if we include into the framework Akerlof-Yellen’s fair wage-eﬀort hypothesis extended at the
industry level.
In Akerlof and Yellen (1988, 1990)’s model the variable eﬀort depends on “fairness, morale and
cohesiveness” of labor that are negatively aﬀected by wage dispersion2. As a consequence, the maximum
level of eﬀort that workers are willing to exert depends on the subjectively perceived fair wage. The
fair wage is determined in a natural way as a function of the remuneration of the other members of the
same industry and the relative working conditions. Then, if the reference point is a considerably high
remuneration, people have in mind a high fair wage. If we consider an economy composed of only two
sectors, it is natural to expect that in the capital intensive (high wage) sector3 the fair wage is higher
than in the labor-intensive (low wage) one.
We can now study the implications for comparative advantage. For the sake of clarity, we can focus
the attention on trade unions and suppose that union power is the same across sectors. In our framework,
union policies aimed at improving the working conditions (for instance providing higher wages for low
wage workers) cause two eﬀects: ﬁrst the cost of one unit of labor increases, second the eﬀort level goes
up in both sectors as a consequence of reduced wage diﬀerentials at the industry level4.H e r e t h e r e i s
no reason why the increase in the eﬀort level should be relatively smaller in the capital-intensive sector.
Indeed the endogenous maximum eﬀort level depends on the perceived fair wage that is higher in this
industry than in the labor-intensive one. As a consequence we have that, on the one side, the capital
cost savings from higher eﬀort are relatively greater in the capital-intensive sector; on the other, the
labor-intensive sector is relatively more disfavored by an increase in wages. Thus, the former industry is
likely to be relatively advantaged and the latter disadvantaged by the institutional intervention.
2See also Levine (1991).
3As Freeman and Medoﬀ (1984) notice, when plants are unionized white-collar workers and executives receive beneﬁts
to make their remunerations more similar to the higher wages of the white-collar workers. The case of the General Motors
in 1982 is an interesting example of this phenomenon.
4The labor-augmenting eﬀect of stronger trade unions is also discussed by Moene and Wallerstein (1997) using a model
that compares union-eﬀects on productivity respectively in local and centralized bargaining regimes. Evidence for these
predictions is found for Finland, Norway, and Sweden until the ’90s.
4Empirical evidence consistent with our predictions is suggested by Davis and Henrekson (2004) in a
comparative study of Sweden and the United States. The main idea of their paper is that rigid labor
market institutions favor industrial categories with low wage dispersion and above-average mean wages
(capital-intensive), while disfavor industries with high wage dispersion or low wages (labor-intensive).
In the remaining part of the paper we test the above predictions in a sample of OECD countries.
From an empirical point of view, the goal of testing the eﬀects of labor institutions on comparative
advantage is particularly diﬃcult for at least three reasons that are listed below.
First, properly measuring comparative advantage is diﬃcult since we cannot observe prices in autarchy.
This is one of the reasons why it is hard to present conclusive evidence on the determinants of comparative
advantage and theories based on comparative advantage generally perform very poorly on an empirical
ground. So we have to rely on other indicators that derive from the observation about how certain sectors
perform relatively to others.
Second, it is very problematic to provide comparable measures of institutions and to tackle the issues
stemming from their interaction. Then, we have to control for diﬀerent labor institutions. Unfortunately,
some important variables cannot be included in our investigation due to data shortage. Indeed, since we
intend to maintain our sample composed of the largest possible number of countries, we have to choose
those institutions for which we have a suﬃciently large number of observations for all the countries in
the sample.
Finally, labor institutions are supposed to be endogenous, since they are typically aﬀected by other
elements of the economic system. In particular, with regard to our main concern on comparative ad-
vantage, we have to consider that labor institutions may be highly correlated with factor endowments.
Thus, implementing instrumental variable estimation and testing for misspeciﬁcation is crucial in order
to obtain reliable results.
In the following paragraph, we present our econometric strategy that is designed in order to deal with
the problems just mentioned.
53E c o n o m e t r i c s t r a t e g y
The starting point of our empirical strategy is provided by Harrigan (1997a). The author tests the eﬀects
of relative factor endowments and total factor productivity on the relative economic performance for a
number of manufacturing sectors. He estimates the following trans-log function that is directly derived
from an extension of the dual approach to international trade5:












where Sjct is the share of sector j in country c and period t, njc is the country ﬁxed eﬀect, djt the time
ﬁxed eﬀect, θkct represents a Hicks-neutral technological parameter for sector k6, vict is factor endowment
of i, and ζjct is the residual term. N is the number of sectors and M is the number of factors. Model (1),
that hereafter we call the basic model, represents a system of N equations (one for each sector) over a panel
of countries and years. The country ﬁxed eﬀects control for unobserved heterogeneity across countries,
whereas the time ﬁxed eﬀects control for macroeconomic shocks that may involve several countries in the
sample in a certain year.
Three underlying assumptions are relevant for the following discussion. First, cross-sector technology
eﬀects are assumed to be symmetrical, so that αkj = αjk ∀ k,j. Second, the free trade hypothesis holds,
then each country is supposed to have the same prices in each period considered. As a consequence, the
price eﬀects are included in the time ﬁxed eﬀects. Finally, consistently with the neoclassical tradition
in international trade literature, factor endowments are supposed to be exogenous with respect to the
production structure.
Following Harrigan (1997a) and assuming the same theoretical background, we now introduce the
hypothesis that the factor allocation takes time. Thus, we can rewrite model (1) to allow for slow
adjustment to equilibrium and to include the lagged sector share:



















where the coeﬃcient reﬂecting the speed of adjustment, γ, is constrained to be the same for each sector
5See Harrigan (1997a) for details on the regression speciﬁcation, and Dixit and Norman (1980) for the theoretical
background.
6We remark that technology is assumed neutral across factors but nonneutral across sectors.
6in order to maintain the symmetry restrictions.
Although models (1) and (2) are theoretically well founded, they overlook the possible eﬀects of the
labor institutions. Thus, we extend the general production function that Harrigan assumes to embed
endogenous eﬀort, which is aﬀected by the diverse institutions of the labor market. Ideally, we should
include industry-speciﬁc institutions to isolate the relative eﬀects. However, in absence of industry-speciﬁc
indicators of labor market regulations, we reformulate (1) and (2) as follows:














δljλlct + ηjct (3)





























is a parameter that includes the eﬀect of institution l in country c at time t, λlct are the
institutional variables, and L is the number of institutions that we control for.
Equation (1) through (4) are estimated extending Harrigan’s sample, which consists of 10 OECD
countries (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany7, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Sweden,
the United States) for the 1970-1988 period, to include 11 OECD countries (the same as above plus
Finland) for the period 1970-1994. Including into the sample the ﬁrst half of the ’90s is particularly
important for our purpose of testing institutional eﬀects, since many changes in the labor market occurred
in this period. The empirical study is implemented to analyze relative performance of seven manufacturing
industries that are classiﬁed according to the International Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (ISIC)a t
the two-digit level (Food, Apparel, Paper, Chemicals, Glass, Metals, and Machinery).
While detailed data description is reported in the Appendix, in the remaining part of the paragraph
w ep r o v i d es o m ed e ﬁnitions and useful remarks.
The dependent variable of our model (Sjct)i sgdp of sector j over gdp of total manufacturing for each
country (c) and each sector (j)o v e rt i m e( t).
Total factor productivity is computed consistently with Harrigan (1997a) in order to maintain com-

























7West Germany until 1989.
8For a more detailed treatment of formula (5) we refer to Cave et al. (1992) and Harrigan (1997a, 1997b, 1999).
7where TFP jbc denotes the total factor productivity of sector j in country b relative to the total factor
productivity of sector j in country c expressed with reference to a certain base year; yj is the value added
in sector j; l and k are respectively the labor and capital inputs; k and l are respectively the geometric
means per sector and year across countries. Finally, σ is equal to (s + s)/2, where s is labor’s share in
total cost and s is the arithmetic mean of s for each sector and year across countries. Formula (5) is
a superlative index number and represents a relative measure. For the sake of comparability, the base
country taken in this paper is the United States and the base year is 1988 as in Harrigan (1997a).
In order to deal with possible noises that aﬀect the labor’s share, we also employ a smoothing procedure
that uses the ﬁtted values from the following expression as labor’s share in the TFP computation:






Our results for the total factor productivity, computed with both the restricted sample (10 countries,
1970-88) and our extended sample (11 countries, 1970-94), and comparison with Harrigan’s results are
available upon requests.
As factor endowments, we use capital, labor and arable land. Moreover, we consider two diﬀerent
kinds of capital that are producer durable goods (prod durable) and other nonresidential constructions
(nonres constr), whereas labor force is classiﬁed as: workers with high education (high workers), workers
with medium education (med workers), and workers with low education (low workers).
Finally, we adopt two main measures for labor market institutions: the net union density (union
density) as the ratio of total reported union members to wage and salaried employees and the index for
bargaining coordination (coordination) that is increasing with the degree of coordination in the bargaining
process on the employers’ as well as on the unions’ side.
4 Empirical results
4.1 The basic model
The ﬁrst step of our empirical strategy consists in estimating the two models (1) and (2) using our
extended sample9.
9Hereafter, we always use our extended sample to obtain the reported results.
8System (1) is estimated as a restricted SUR10 model under linear cross-equation symmetry constraints
using country-year panel data11. The within estimator is implemented by allowing for both country and
time ﬁxed eﬀects. In estimating system (2), we apply a 3SLS12 procedure and include the sector share
two-period lagged as instrumental variable for the sector share one-period lagged in order to obtain
consistent estimators (see Harrigan, 1997a, Hsiao, 1986).
Tables 1 and 2 report respectively our results for the two regressions. Comments are provided below.
All the own-TFP eﬀect coeﬃcients are positive and highly signiﬁcant (with the only exception of the
Food sector in eq. (1) that is signiﬁcant only at the 20% level). We remark that Harrigan (1997a) ﬁnds a
negative coeﬃcient in the Food sector and a nonsigniﬁcant coeﬃcient in the Paper sector for the model
with instantaneous adjustment. The cross-TFP eﬀects are mixed as theory predicts.
T u r n i n gt ot h ee ﬀects of factor endowments, in Table 1, at least one of the two kinds of capital
is positively signiﬁcant in all sectors but the Paper and Machinery industries. In Table 2 the other
coeﬃcients referred to capital show somewhat lower signiﬁcance, providing that in general (as Harrigan,
1997a, points out) the assumed slow adjustment obscures the factor endowments’ eﬀects that work in the
instantaneous adjustment framework.
The estimated coeﬃcients on relative labor supply in Table 1 suggest the following conclusions. All
the three groups of workers (with respectively high, medium and low education) are always signiﬁcant
in the Apparel sector (which is the most relatively labor-intensive), and mostly negatively signiﬁcant in
the Chemicals and Metals sectors (which are the most relatively capital-intensive). Highly educated and
medium educated workers enter signiﬁcantly and positively into the equation of the Machinery sector.
Finally, the coeﬃcients on labor have no (or low) signiﬁcance elsewhere (Food, Paper, Glass). In Table
2, the parameters on labor endowments are mostly nonsigniﬁcant, with the exception of the coeﬃcient
10Seemingly unrelated regression.
11To take account of the classical measurement errors that may aﬀect the TFP values, Harrigan (1997a) uses instrumental






where C is the total number of countries, k :1 ,...N is the sector index, and t is the year index. This procedure follows the
assumption that technology levels are correlated between countries but classical measurement errors are not. We have also
implemented this procedure, but the results do not diﬀer in an important way from the ones obtained without instruments.
Moreover, the Hausman test always leads not to reject the model without instruments.
12Three-stage least squares.
9on workers with low education in the Apparel sector that still shows a relevant positive eﬀect.
Tab. 1: Regression (1). Instantaneous adjustment
Food Apparel Paper Chemic. Glass Metals Machin.
TFP food 0.0810 -0.1424 0.0188 0.0464 -0.1506 0.0033 0.0641
1.32 -3.52∗∗ 0.42 1.59 -4.95∗∗ 0.10 1.01
TFP apparel -0.1424 0.3945 0.0670 0.0672 -0.0741 -0.1215 -0.1187
-3.52∗∗ 7.60∗∗ 1.63 2.74∗∗ -2.52∗∗ -4.17∗∗ -2.12∗∗
TFP paper 0.0188 0.0670 0.2197 -0.1025 0.1611 0.0736 -0.1180
0.42 1.63 3.40∗∗ -3.56∗∗ 5.17∗∗ 2.20∗∗ -1.69∗
TFP chemic. 0.0464 0.0672 -0.1025 0.3469 -0.0578 -0.0445 -0.2978
1.59 2.74∗∗ -3.56∗∗ 10.56∗∗ -3.19∗∗ -1.76∗ -6.14∗∗
TFP glass -0.1506 -0.0741 0.1611 -0.0578 0.1942 -0.0207 -0.0367
-4.95∗∗ -2.52∗∗ 5.17∗∗ -3.19∗∗ 5.68∗∗ -1.02 -0.87
TFP metals 0.0033 -0.1215 0.0736 -0.0445 -0.0207 0.2198 -0.0077
0.10 -4.17∗∗ 2.20∗∗ -1.76∗ -1.02 5.52∗∗ -0.15
TFP machin. 0.0641 -0.1187 -0.1180 -0.2978 -0.0367 -0.0077 0.3328
1.01 -2.12∗∗ -1.69∗ -6.14∗∗ -0.87 -0.15 2.44∗∗
Prod durable 0.2003 0.2535 0.0349 -0.0208 -0.0071 -0.3031 -0.0872
4.02∗∗ 6.01∗∗ 0.75 -0.40 -0.26 -6.39∗∗ -0.92
Nonres constr -0.0344 -0.3779 -0.0723 0.1904 -0.0819 0.1789 0.1372
-0.45 -6.24∗∗ -1.01 2.47∗∗ -1.98∗∗ 2.54∗∗ 0.93
High workers -0.0169 0.0783 0.0107 -0.0859 -0.0260 -0.1917 0.1904
-0.55 3.10∗∗ 0.37 -2.65∗∗ -1.55 -6.53∗∗ 3.27∗∗
Med workers -0.0780 0.1620 -0.0909 -0.2595 0.0378 -0.0401 0.2439
-1.73∗ 4.34∗∗ -2.17∗∗ -5.34∗∗ 1.56 -0.93 2.85∗∗
Low workers 0.0489 0.1126 -0.1053 -0.0987 -0.0119 -0.0400 0.0546
1.32 3.74∗∗ -3.06∗∗ -2.49∗∗ -0.60 -1.09 0.78
Arable land 0.1458 0.0887 -0.0647 -0.2483 0.0528 0.0668 -0.1955
1.60 1.21 -0.76 -2.50∗∗ 1.09 0.77 -1.13
t-statistics reported. ∗∗ 5% signiﬁcance (|t|=1.96); ∗ 10% signiﬁcance (|t|=1.64).
Finally, arable land has in general either no or weak eﬀect on relative sector share in all the equations.
The correspondent parameter, in Table 1, is negative and signiﬁcant only in the Chemicals sector, while it
is positive and signiﬁcant at the 20% level in the Food sector. This result is quite encouraging. We remark
that Harrigan (1997a) obtained a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient in the Food (relative land-intensive)
sector, and positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients in the Chemicals and Metals (relative capital-intensive)
ones. Again in Table 2, the parameters on land are mostly nonsigniﬁcant.
10Tab. 2: Regression (2). Slow adjustment
F o o d A p p a r e lP a p e r C h e m i c .G l a s s M e t a l s M a c h i n .
Sjct−1 0.7298 0.7298 0.7298 0.7298 0.7298 0.7298 0.7298
35.41∗∗ 35.41∗∗ 35.41∗∗ 35.41∗∗ 35.41∗∗ 35.41∗∗ 35.41∗∗
TFP food 0.1619 -0.0785 0.0233 0.0371 -0.0619 -0.0929 -0.0637
3.10∗∗ -3.33∗∗ 0.61 1.52 -2.69∗∗ -3.07∗∗ -1.34
TFP apparel -0.0785 0.1204 -0.0211 0.0502 -0.0310 -0.0230 -0.0317
-3.33∗∗ 4.41∗∗ -0.86 3.76∗∗ -1.65∗ -1.82∗∗ -1.09
TFP paper 0.0233 -0.0211 0.1666 -0.0468 0.0443 0.0195 -0.0980
0.61 -0.86 3.07∗∗ -1.95∗ 1.86∗ 0.67 -0.0980
TFP chemic. 0.0371 0.0502 -0.0468 0.0882 -0.0308 -0.0058 -0.0982
1.52 3.76∗∗ -1.95∗ 3.09∗∗ -2.35∗∗ -0.27 -2.76∗∗
TFP glass -0.0619 -0.0310 0.0443 -0.0308 0.1302 0.0015 -0.0485
-2.69∗∗ -1.65∗ 1.86∗ -2.35∗∗ 5.04∗∗ 0.10 -1.66∗
TFP metals -0.0929 -0.0230 0.0195 -0.0058 0.0015 0.1519 -0.0150
-3.07∗∗ -1.82∗∗ 0.67 -0.27 0.10 4.39∗∗ -0.39
TFP machin. -0.0637 -0.0317 -0.0980 -0.0982 -0.0485 -0.0150 0.3191
-1.34 -1.09 -1.87∗ -2.76∗∗ -1.66∗ -0.39 3.73∗∗
Prod durable 0.1089 0.0641 -0.0144 0.0585 0.0094 -0.0796 -0.1596
2.81∗∗ 3.09∗∗ -0.39 1.42 0.48 -2.09∗∗ -2.62∗∗
Nonres constr 0.0739 -0.1132 -0.0157 0.0354 -0.0444 -0.0120 0.0915
1.17 -3.49∗∗ -0.26 0.54 -1.47 -0.20 0.89
High workers 0.0352 0.0224 0.0080 0.0142 -0.0162 -0.0678 -0.0166
1.41 1.84∗ 0.34 0.54 -1.40 -2.78∗∗ -0.42
Med workers 0.0085 0.0239 -0.0581 -0.0277 -0.0014 -0.0581 0.0562
0.23 1.28 -1.67∗ -0.68 -0.08 -1.61 0.96
Low workers 0.0405 0.0364 -0.0472 -0.0070 0.0045 -0.0205 -0.0241
1.33 2.46∗∗ -1.65∗ -0.22 0.32 -0.66 -0.51
Arable land -0.0905 0.0534 0.0365 -0.1166 -0.0244 0.1336 0.0227
-1.25 1.54 0.54 -1.45 -0.73 1.89∗ -0.20
t-statistics reported. ∗∗ 5% signiﬁcance (|t|=1.96); ∗ 10% signiﬁcance (|t|=1.64).
Tables 3 and 4 report diagnostic tests for the joint signiﬁcance of the parameters. The null hypothesis
that all the coeﬃcients are equal to zero is always rejected for the two speciﬁcations. Moreover, we run
the regression-based form of the Hausman test13 for model (2) to examine the endogeneity of the lagged
sector shares as independent variables. We ﬁnd that the null hypothesis that the lagged sector shares are
exogenous is rejected at the 1% level suggesting to use instrumental variables.
13See Hausman (1978, 1983).


















N. of obs. = 243 N. of params = 14
Hausman: χ2
7= 32.71 p = 0.0000
4.2 The eﬀects of the labor institutions
In this paragraph we turn to test if the inclusion of variables that reﬂect the cross-country diversity
in the institutional setting of the labor market provides any impact on the relative performance of
diﬀerent production sectors. To this extent, the econometric framework introduced in paragraph 4.1 is
a tremendously useful tool as it already includes the two main determinants of comparative advantage
maintained by the literature: relative factor endowments and technological levels. In this paragraph we
use two measures of labor institutions: the union density rate and the degree of bargaining coordination.
In the following paragraph we include some additional variables to check the robustness of our results..
A ﬁrst issue to face when we deal with institutions is the one of endogeneity. To this regard, we
employ a 3SLS procedure that allows for instrumental variable estimator, using the same panel country-
year for each sector as in the previous paragraph14. The strategy is fully consistent since the 3SLS
method generalizes the 2SLS15 to take account of the correlations between equations in the same way
as SUR generalizes OLS. As instrumental variables for the labor market institutions, we have chosen
political variables that summarize the cumulative number of respectively left and right seats held by
all government parties from 1946 to the year of observation. These political variables are supposed to
be highly correlated with changes in the labor market institutions. This intuition is conﬁrmed by the
results shown in Table 5 that contains information on the ﬁrst stage regressions. As one can notice,
the null hypothesis that all the coeﬃcients are jointly zero is always rejected at a high conﬁdence level.
14Results obtained without including instrumental variables are available upon request.
15Two-stage least squares.
12Furthermore, due to the time lag, the instruments are considered exogenous with respect to the dependent
variable. For these reasons our instruments may be reckoned reliable.
Tab. 5: First stage information
Regression (3)
Instrumented R2 Fp - v a l u e
Union dens. 0.7048 39.80 0.0000
Coordination 0.4112 11.64 0.0000
N. of obs = 250, N. of params = 15
Regression (4)
Instrumented R2 Fp - v a l u e
Union dens. 0.7840 36.47 0.0000
Coordination 0.4584 8.50 0.0000
N. of obs = 221, N. of params = 22
Respectively, in Tables 6 and 7, we report the estimation results for model (3) with instantaneous
adjustment and for model (4) with slow adjustment to equilibrium.
First, we discuss the direct eﬀects of labor market institutions on relative sector performance. As one
can observe, the conclusions vary signiﬁcantly between sectors. The coeﬃcient on union density is in gen-
eral negative in the relatively labor-intensive sectors and positive in the relatively capital-intensive ones.
In particular, the highest positive value is in the Machinery industry (2.5396) and the highest negative
value is in the Apparel industry (-1.4623); the coeﬃcients in the other sectors are within this range. The
eﬀects of the degree of the bargaining coordination are quite diﬀerent providing that institutions work
in a diﬀerent way in diﬀerent sectors. Indeed, the values for the parameter on bargaining coordination
are positive and signiﬁcant in both Apparel and Machinery categories, whereas they are negative and
signiﬁcant in the Paper and Chemicals sectors, and not signiﬁcant elsewhere.
Turning to the eﬀects of the introduction of labor institutions on the other parameters, ﬁrstly we
observe that the TFP coeﬃcients are almost always consistent with Table 1. The only exception is
in the Apparel sector where the own-TFP eﬀect turns out to be nonsigniﬁcant after the labor market
institutions are taken into account. The coeﬃcients on production durable goods in general show the same
sign and signiﬁcance as before, while the coeﬃcients on nonresidential constructions change somewhere.
Finally, arable land’s eﬀect never turns out to be signiﬁcant once labor institutions are included into the
model.
We ﬁnd very interesting results also with regard to the labor endowments. Comparing Table 6 with
Table 1, we observe that the coeﬃcients on workers with high education have mostly unchanged sign
and signiﬁcance, but in the Apparel and in the Chemicals sectors. Indeed, in the former industry the
13considered coeﬃcient, that was positive before, now becomes negative, while in the latter the opposite is
true. This result is relevant since the relative eﬀect of workers with high education is much more plausible
to be positive on the gdp share of the Chemicals sector and negative on the gdp share of the Apparel
sector. Similar conclusions hold for workers with medium education, whose coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant
elsewhere once we control for labor institutions. Finally, interestingly enough, the parameters on workers
with low education retain unchanged sign and signiﬁcance in the two speciﬁcations. In particular, the
coeﬃcient in the Apparel sector remains signiﬁcant at a high conﬁdence level and positive, consistently
with theoretical predictions.
Tab. 6: Regression (3). Instantaneous adjustment
F o o d A p p a r e lP a p e r C h e m i c .G l a s s M e t a l sM a c h i n .
TFP food 0.1091 -0.1287 -0.0003 0.0269 -0.1467 0.0225 0.0589
1.79∗ -2.51∗∗ -0.01 0.83 -4.91∗∗ 0.52 0.97
TFP apparel -0.1287 0.0749 0.0507 0.0205 -0.0823 0.1397 -0.0811
-2.51∗∗ 0.88 0.90 0.48 -2.31∗∗ 2.67∗∗ -1.14
TFP paper -0.0003 0.0508 0.3666 -0.0719 0.1676 -0.0257 -0.2935
-0.01 0.90 5.05∗∗ -2.18∗∗ 5.08∗∗ -0.55 -4.26∗∗
TFP chemic. 0.0268 0.0204 -0.0719 0.4319 -0.0527 -0.1632 -0.2773
0.83 0.48 -2.18∗∗ 9.65∗∗ -2.74∗∗ -5.04∗∗ -5.29∗∗
TFP glass -0.1467 -0.0823 0.1676 -0.0527 0.1866 -0.0047 -0.0118
-4.91∗∗ -2.31∗∗ 5.08∗∗ -2.74∗∗ 5.65∗∗ -0.16 -0.29
TFP metals 0.0224 0.1400 -0.0256 -0.1632 -0.0047 0.2524 -0.0924
0.52 2.67∗∗ -0.55 -5.04∗∗ -0.16 4.20∗∗ -1.55
TFP machin. 0.0589 -0.0811 -0.2935 -0.2773 -0.0118 -0.0924 0.3874
0.97 -1.14 -4.26∗∗ -5.29∗∗ -0.29 -1.55 3.20∗∗
Prod durable 0.1720 0.4412 -0.0602 -0.2989 0.0034 -0.1786 0.0407
2.85∗∗ 5.59∗∗ -1.04 -3.67∗∗ 0.11 -2.86∗∗ 0.38
Nonres constr 0.0013 -0.5390 0.0934 0.3622 -0.1032 0.1673 0.0102
0.02 -5.27∗∗ 1.21 3.36∗∗ -2.46∗∗ 2.21∗∗ 0.07
High workers 0.0011 -0.2530 0.0374 0.1103 -0.0691 -0.0835 0.3410
0.02 -3.72∗∗ 0.72 1.74∗ -2.34∗∗ -1.59 4.02∗∗
Med workers -0.0314 -0.2180 -0.0372 -0.0114 0.0118 0.0444 0.2045
-0.50 -2.54∗∗ -0.60 -0.14 0.33 0.70 1.90∗
Low workers 0.0593 0.2106 -0.0841 -0.1906 0.0129 -0.0525 -0.040
1.40 3.74∗∗ -2.13∗∗ -3.06∗∗ 0.62 -1.32 -1.20
Arable land 0.1283 -0.0358 -0.0684 -0.1098 0.0632 -0.0735 -0.1745
1.36 -0.29 -0.76 -0.81 1.31 -0.82 -1.02
Union density -0.2359 -1.4623 -0.3613 0.3174 -0.3319 0.8971 2.5396
-1.01 -4.76∗∗ -1.50 1.04 -2.51∗∗ 3.74∗∗ 6.34∗∗
Coordination -0.2078 0.9566 -0.40132 -1.0619 0.0201 0.2337 0.8138
-1.52 5.25∗∗ -3.02∗∗ -6.23∗∗ 0.25 1.55 3.56∗∗
t-statistics reported. ∗∗ 5% signiﬁcance (|t|=1.96); ∗ 10% signiﬁcance (|t|=1.64).
In Table 7, we show the results of the estimation of model (4) under the assumption of slow adjustment
14to equilibrium. As one can notice, the estimated coeﬃcients are in general consistent with the conclusions
suggested by Table 6, although again they are signiﬁcant at a lower conﬁdence level than before. In
particular, the values of the parameters on factor endowments represent evidence for weaker eﬀects on
comparative advantage. On the contrary, labor market institutions have almost always the same sign
and signiﬁcance as in Table 6, providing robustness of the above conclusions.
Tab. 7: Regression (4). Slow adjustment
F o o d A p p a r e lP a p e r C h e m i c .G l a s s M e t a l s M a c h i n .
Sjct−1 0.6331 0.6331 0.6331 0.6331 0.6331 0.6331 0.6331
23.77∗∗ 23.77∗∗ 23.77∗∗ 23.77∗∗ 23.77∗∗ 23.77∗∗ 23.77∗∗
TFP food 0.1511 -0.0946 0.0224 0.0355 -0.0686 -0.0726 -0.0598
2.92∗∗ -3.73∗∗ 0.55 1.38 -3.00∗∗ -2.02∗∗ -1.25
TFP apparel -0.0946 0.0999 0.0541 0.0368 -0.0598 0.0126 -0.0521
-3.73∗∗ 3.26∗∗ 1.78∗ 2.39∗∗ -2.93∗∗ 0.55 -1.66∗
TFP paper 0.0224 0.0541 0.2851 -0.0547 0.0787 -0.0189 -0.2213
0.55 1.78∗ 4.41∗∗ -1.97∗∗ 2.94∗∗ -0.49 -3.80∗∗
TFP chemic. 0.0355 0.0368 -0.0547 0.1501 -0.0435 -0.0421 -0.1102
1.38 2.39∗∗ -1.97∗∗ 4.76∗∗ -3.08∗∗ -1.59 -2.91∗∗
TFP glass -0.0686 -0.0598 0.0787 -0.0435 0.1292 0.0269 -0.0462
-3.00∗∗ -2.93∗∗ 2.94∗∗ -3.08∗∗ 5.08∗∗ 1.34 -1.58
TFP metals -0.0726 0.0126 -0.0189 -0.0421 0.0269 0.1951 -0.0483
-2.02∗∗ 0.55 -0.49 -1.59 1.34 4.11∗∗ -1.05
TFP machin. -0.0598 -0.0521 -0.2213 -0.1102 -0.0462 -0.0483 0.4219
-1.25 -1.66∗ -3.80∗∗ -2.91∗∗ -1.58 -1.05 4.80∗∗
Prod durable 0.1363 0.0897 -0.0456 -0.0146 0.0180 -0.0528 -0.1222
3.14∗∗ 3.64∗∗ -1.04 -0.31 0.86 -1.16 -1.76∗
Nonres constr 0.0546 -0.1410 0.1014 0.1020 -0.0566 0.0046 -0.0215
0.87 -3.80∗∗ 1.50 1.46 -1.81∗ 0.07 -0.20
High workers 0.0225 -0.0519 0.0181 0.0248 -0.0533 -0.0790 0.1034
0.67 -2.45∗∗ 0.51 0.70 -3.11∗∗ -2.31∗∗ 1.91∗
Med workers -0.0208 -0.0429 -0.0145 -0.0040 -0.0386 -0.0574 0.1161
-0.46 -1.55 -0.32 -0.08 -1.72∗ -1.22 1.60
Low workers 0.04110 0.0610 -0.0333 -0.0131 0.0078 -0.0171 -0.0826
1.30 3.71∗∗ -1.08 -0.37 0.55 -0.54 -1.61
Arable land -0.0783 0.0488 0.0424 -0.0838 -0.0264 0.0909 -0.0776
-1.07 1.28 0.58 -1.01 -0.78 1.23 -0.65
Union density 0.0248 -0.5341 -0.3749 -0.1810 -0.1996 0.0692 1.3484
0.14 -4.93∗∗ -2.04∗∗ -0.99 -2.32∗∗ 0.39 4.71∗∗
Coordination 0.0576 0.0850 -0.3014 -0.2585 0.0692 0.0966 0.2933
0.69 1.71∗ -3.54∗∗ -2.83∗∗ 1.67∗ 1.05 2.24∗∗
t-statistics reported. ∗∗ 5% signiﬁcance (|t|=1.96); ∗ 10% signiﬁcance (|t|=1.64).
Tables 8 and 9 oﬀer some diagnostic tests. The hypothesis of no signiﬁcance of all the parameters
is always rejected at the 1% level. We also report the results obtained from the regression-based form
of the Hausman test. We obtain that the institutional variables are possibly endogenous supporting our
15choice of implementing a 3SLS estimation procedure.
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Hausman: χ2
21= 47.07 p = 0.0000
Finally, in Table 10 we report the correlation coeﬃcients between predicted and actual (demeaned)
values of the gdp share for each sector using the four models considered. The correlation coeﬃcients are
always positive.
Tab 10: Correlation between predicted and actual values
Reg. (1) Reg. (2) Reg. (3) Reg. (4)
Eq.     
Food 0.4570 0.7538 0.4292 0.7536
Apparel 0.6700 0.9407 0.4308 0.9212
Paper 0.3271 0.6553 0.2791 0.6108
Chemic. 0.6709 0.8281 0.5298 0.8197
Glass 0.5628 0.8164 0.6009 0.8094
Metals 0.6134 0.7958 0.6333 0.7952
Machin. 0.4728 0.8396 0.5381 0.8276
4.3 Sensitivity analysis
In this subsection we present the results of a simple sensitivity analysis16 and implement some control
checks to face the complex issue of institutional interaction.
First, we test the robustness of our conclusions by introducing the total gdp per capita as an additional
explanatory variable. Indeed, on the one hand, it may be argued that the union density rate can be a
proxy for the total gdp per capita as poorer countries are more likely to have a lower union participa-
16Through the sensitivity analysis we want to examine whether our previous results are robust or fragile to: (i)c h a n g e s
in the conditioning information set (i.e. results are not altered if we include in the regression other explicative variables
that might aﬀect the specialization structure) and (ii) changes in the proxies chosen for the institutional variables, also
allowing for interactions among diﬀerent institutions.
16tion. On the other, including this variable into our model is informative in order to control for possible
domestic demand eﬀects on the specialization structure. We obtained that the main conclusions derived
in paragraph 4.2 remain almost unchanged even once the gdp eﬀect is controlled for. In particular, the
coeﬃcients of the labor market institutions show the same sign and signiﬁcance as, respectively, in Tables
6 and 7 (results are available upon request). This is interpreted as evidence for the robustness of our
results.
In the remaining part of this paragraph, we deal with the issue of institutional interactions. As we
have already noticed, the eﬀects of each labor market institution in a certain country depend on the
overall institutional framework considered and on the diﬀerent relations of either complementarity or
substitutability that may exist among the relevant variables. In particular, unionization patterns can be
strongly aﬀected by other variables that change the economic incentives to join a trade union (see for
instance Checchi and Lucifora, 2002). Therefore, alternative institutional scenarios are likely to modify
the nature of the mechanisms that we are investigating.
First, we allow for the possibility that the union density and the degree of bargaining coordination
aﬀect each other. To shed light on this issue, we regress the union density on the degree of bargaining
coordination using a panel estimation with country ﬁxed eﬀect. We ﬁnd a coeﬃcient equal to -0.6884
(with t = −2.81). This result suggests a substitutability relation between the two variables17. To take
account of this ﬁnding, we re-estimate our model using the diﬀerence between the union density and
the bargaining coordination rate (that we call net union power or nup) rather than the two variables
separately considered. We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients on nup a r en e g a t i v ea n ds i g n i ﬁcant in the Apparel
and Paper sectors, and positive and signiﬁcant in the Metals and Machinery categories; no signiﬁcant
eﬀect is found elsewhere. This result conﬁrms our previous conclusions summarized in Table 6.
Second, we include into regression (3) other institutional variables in addition to the union density and
the bargaining coordination rate. The aim is to control for possible interaction eﬀects and to verify the
sensitivity of the results to the institutional measures chosen in the previous regressions. Three variables
that are usually considered relevant to the deﬁnition of the institutional climate that characterizes the
17The most evident examples of this phenomenon are France, Germany and Japan where the union density rate is below
and the degree of bargaining coordination is above the OECD average.
17domestic labor market are: employment protection legislation (epl), unemployment beneﬁt replacement
rate (brr) and unemployment beneﬁt durations (bd). Then we repeat the estimation results for model
(3) adding alternatively one of these three additional control variables18. Starting with epl,w eﬁnd that
our previous results are quite robust and all the conclusions derived in paragraph 4.2 remain unchanged.
Furthermore, the coeﬃcients on employment protection legislation are always nonsigniﬁcant but in the
Chemicals sector where we obtain a positive value. Turning to the second control variable (brr), we
notice that the introduction of the beneﬁt replacement rate alters somewhat the output of the regression.
Indeed, the own-TFP eﬀects become nonsigniﬁcant in the Food, Apparel and Paper industries and are
always weaker even when they remain signiﬁcant. Interestingly enough, the eﬀect of the union density on
the sector share changes in the Apparel sector, where the correspondent coeﬃcient is now nonsigniﬁcant,
and in the Metals category, where it becomes negative (however, it is still positive and signiﬁcant in the
Chemicals and Machinery industries). The parameters correspondent to the unemployment beneﬁt rate
have negative and statistically signiﬁcant values in the Apparel and Chemicals sectors, while positive and
signiﬁcant in the Paper and Metals ones, and are nonsigniﬁcant elsewhere. Finally, the inclusion of the
beneﬁt durations (bd) does not modify the previous conclusions in an important way. The correspondent
coeﬃcients are always nonsigniﬁcant but in the Apparel category where the estimated value is negative.
Summarizing, the introduction of the mentioned control variables reveal that interactions within the
institutional system are important and their eﬀects diﬀer from sector to sector. Although our previous
conclusions are in general robust to the implemented control checks, further research on these interaction
eﬀects is suggested.
5 Conclusions
The main goal of this paper is to study the role of diﬀerent determinants of comparative advantage in
the OECD countries: factor endowments, technological levels, and institutions. The basic econometric
framework is provided by Harrigan (1997a) that includes the ﬁrst two but not the third component of
comparative advantage. Therefore, the contribution of the paper is twofold. First, we replicate Harrigan’s
18As instruments we adopt political variables that summarize the cumulative number of, respectively, left, central and
right seats held by all government parties from 1946 to the year of observation. First stage regression results again conﬁrm
the relevance of all the instruments. Econometric output is available upon request.
18results extending his original sample to include more countries and a larger period of time. Second, we
make explicit the eﬀects of labor institutions on comparative advantage. To the best of our knowledge
this is the ﬁrst study that pursues this aim from an empirical point of view. The implemented analysis
suggests a number of interesting conclusions.
Consistently with Harrigan (1997a), we ﬁnd that technological levels are a very important determinant
of the relative sectorial performance. Indeed, the own-TFP eﬀects are almost always signiﬁcant at a high
conﬁdence level and positive. Furthermore, such a result is very robust across diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
With regard to the eﬀects of relative factor endowments on international specialization, our results
are in general very consistent with the theory (relative land abundance aﬀects positively gdp share in the
Food sector, relative labor abundance aﬀects gdp share positively in the Apparel sector and negatively in
highly capitalised industries). However, since they diﬀer somewhat from the ones obtained by Harrigan,
it may be argued that the factor endowments’ eﬀects are not very robust, neither across samples nor
across alternative speciﬁcations. This ﬁnding hints that there exist other decisive elements that bias the
eﬀects of relative factor abundance as they are predicted by standard trade models.
Therefore, we include institutional variables in our framework. We ﬁnd that these institutions have
important eﬀects that vary across sectors. In particular, on the one hand, the union density is found to
have a negative eﬀect on comparative advantage in the labor-intensive sectors and a positive eﬀect in the
capital-intensive ones. On the other hand, the bargaining coordination rate’s coeﬃcients are positive and
signiﬁcant in the sectors where the union density has the most important (either positive or negative)
eﬀects, while are negative and signiﬁcant in sectors where the union density does not enter in an important
way. This result suggests that interactions between diﬀerent institutions are very likely to exist and aﬀect
economic performance. Finally, we control for the introduction of gdp per capita and alternative measures
of labor institutions. We conclude in favor of the robustness of our results.
This paper is relevant in two main respects. First, it gives a contribution to the theory of international
trade including a further determinant of the cross-border exchange patterns that is usually not taken into
account. Second, it has important policy implications, in particular with regard to labor reforms and the
debate on single peaked versus diversiﬁed capitalism (Freeman, 2000). Accordingly, as an increasingly
19integrated international economy can potentially limit the freedom of individual countries in choosing
their own model of governance, it may be asked: “Can institutional diﬀerences persist in a global economy
or does competitiveness require that labour institutions converge to a single dominant form?” (Freeman,
2000: 1). In the light of the above empirical evidence, we argue that institutional diﬀerences may turn out
to be a source of comparative advantage for individual countries. As a consequence, domestic governments
might do better to design their own labor market institutions and interventions rather than to converge
to a single institutional model.
Our results represent only a ﬁrst contribution to explore the relation between institutions and relative
economic performance. Some further steps in this direction are suggested. First, the issue of comple-
mentarity versus substitutability of diﬀerent labor market institutions seems worth to be addressed in a
rigorous way to understand how alternative institutions work in alternative regimes. Second, the focus
of the debate may be proﬁtably extended to developing countries.
6 Appendix A: Data description
Total factor productivity computation (TFP). Industry-speciﬁc data used for the TFP com-
putation are taken from the Industrial Sectoral Data Base - OECD Statistical Compendium 1999/2.
All the data are expressed in real terms. Labor input, l, is total employment (ET)19; value added, y
(GDPD), and gross ﬁxed capital stock, k (KTVD), are at constant prices, 1990 purchasing power parity
US dollars. Labor share, s, is compensation of employees (WSSS) at current prices in national currency
over gross domestic product (GDP). Included sectors are: 1- Food, beverages and tobacco (FOD−ISIC
31), 2- Textile, wearing apparel and leather industries (TEX−ISIC 32), 3- Paper and paper products,
printing and publishing (PAP−ISIC 34), 4- Chemicals and chemical petroleum, coal, rubber and plastic
(CHE−ISIC 35), 5- Non-metallic mineral products except products of petroleum (MNM−ISIC 36),
6- Basic metal industries (BMI−ISIC 37), 7- Fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment
(MEQ−ISIC 38)20.
Sector shares (Sjc). The share of sector j is value added of sector j (at constant prices, 1990
19Lowercase letters refer to our variables, while uppercase letters refer to variables as they are deﬁned in the OECD
database.
20Wood (ISIC 33) and other manufacturing (ISIC 39) are excluded due to data shortage.
20purchasing power parity US dollars) −GDPDj− over value added of total manufacturing −GDPDMAN−.
The data source is Industrial Sectoral Data Base - OECD Statistical Compendium 1999/2.
GDP per capita (gdp). GDP per capita in US dollars at current prices and 1990 exchange rates.
The source is OECD Statistical Compendium 1999/2, National Accounts I.
Factor endowments:
Capital input. Capital input is classiﬁed in two diﬀerent kinds of capital that are producer durable
goods (prod durable) and other nonresidential constructions (nonres constr). They are obtained from
the Comparable Welfare State Dataset (assembled by Huber, Ragin, and Stephens, 1997) that includes
extended series from the original dataset − Penny World Table 5.6 (Summers and Heston, 1991). Capital
stocks are expressed per worker. Data (originally at 1985 international prices) are converted in 1990
international prices by author’s calculation.
Labor input. Labor force is classiﬁed in: workers with low education (low workers)t h a ti se q u a l
to (no.ed. + pri.ed.)×lab.for./100 (where no.ed. and pri.ed. are respectively the percentages of “no
schooling” and “primary school attained” in the total population above 25, and lab.for. is labor force);
workers with medium education (med workers)t h a ti se q u a lt osec.ed.× lab.for./100 (where sec.ed. is the
percentage of “secondary school attained” in the total population above 25); workers with high education
(high workers)t h a ti se q u a lt ohigh.ed.×lab.for./100 (where high.ed. is the percentage of “higher school
attained” in the total population above 25). Data on school attainment are from Barro and Lee (2000),
while data on labor force are obtained from the OECD Employment Outlook Labour Force Statistics
(2003). Data are expressed in thousands of persons.
Land input (arable land). Arable land is in thousands of hectares. The data source is World
Development Indicators Database (2004).
Labor market institutions:
Data on labor market institutions are obtained from the Labour Market Institutions Database (Nickell
and Nunziata, 2001). We use the following variables:
Net union density (union density). It is constructed as the ratio of total reported union members
to wage and salaried employees.
21Bargaining coordination (coordination). It is an index within the range (1 − 3) increasing with
the degree of coordination in the bargaining process on the employers as well as on the unions side.
Employment protection legislation (epl). It is an index within the range (1 − 2) increasing with
the strictness of employment protection.
Beneﬁtr e p l a c e m e n tr a t e s( brr). The beneﬁts are a percentage of average earnings before tax and
refer to the ﬁrst year of unemployment beneﬁts, averaged over family types of recipients.
Beneﬁt durations (bd). It is an index constructed as a weighted average of the unemployment
beneﬁt replacement rate received during the ﬁrst ﬁve years of unemployment.
Political variables:
Political variables are obtained from the Comparable Welfare State Dataset (Huber, Ragin, and
Stephens, 1997) and are listed below:
Cumulative percentage of left seats. It is the cumulative number of left seats held by all govern-
ment parties from 1946 to the year of observation.
Cumulative percentage of right seats. It is the cumulative number of right seats held by all
government parties from 1946 to the year of observation.
Cumulative percentage of center seats. It is the cumulative number of center seats held by all
government parties from 1946 to the year of observation.
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